Ghosts and Mind Copies - The Identity Question

[Flyndaran]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

The 'sequence of bits' is precisely what I'm pointing to. A person is closer to, e.g., O Fortuna, which is very different depending on the arrangement, performers, instruments, remixing etc., than to a rigid set of atoms on which said O Fortuna is transcribed.

That's an opinion that feels viscerally wrong as well as inconceivable to many of us.
I fully understand that viscerally wrong ideas have been shown to be right in some cases. But each time it required an extreme amount of evidence to prove. I just don't see anything of the sort with this idea.

It sounds like you are overthinking the concept of identity. I'm me. I don't care how you try to say that that perfect copy over there is also me. That's completely wrong, because I know that only I am me.

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

A person is closer to, e.g., O Fortuna, which is very different depending on the arrangement, performers, instruments, remixing etc., than to a rigid set of atoms on which said O Fortuna is transcribed.

I would define any given person as the particular atoms comprising said person (at any given time) that came to be in that particular configuration as the result of the life process (broadly interpreted, to allow for AI and robots) that resulted from the person's initial creation.

I think this definition includes any conceivable person, be they human, cyborg, robot, AI, or biological extraterrestrials.

The only conceivable persons this definition wouldn't include would be those who did not result from an initial creation and have thus always existed. I will admit that this would pose a curious problem if I seriously accepted the possibility, which I don't.

So, my definition is a rigid set of atoms. If you want to talk about the Ship of Theseus and self-modification--perhaps even brain modification--then we could do that. But I think my definition is very close to what you have to accept to make sense of the idea of individual persons.

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by Flyndaran

I don't care how you try to say that that perfect copy over there is also me. That's completely wrong, because I know that only I am me.

This gets me to thinking about the logic of this.

Premise 1: If I am destroyed, I no longer exist.

Premise 2: The copy of me is also me.

Conclusion: If the copy of me is destroyed, then I no longer exist.


There's no way that can be right. Either the first premise is wrong, or the second premise is wrong. The first premise looks like a tautology to me, so obviously the second--which Vicky Molokh accepts--must be wrong.

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by ErhnamDJ

This gets me to thinking about the logic of this.

Premise 1: If I am destroyed, I no longer exist.

Premise 2: The copy of me is also me.

Conclusion: If the copy of me is destroyed, then I no longer exist.


There's no way that can be right. Either the first premise is wrong, or the second premise is wrong. The first premise looks like a tautology to me, so obviously the second--which Vicky Molokh accepts--must be wrong.

Premise 1 is inaccurate. X no longer exists at all only if all instances of X are destroyed. Me-1984 doesn't exist in 2012, but me-2012 exists in 2012. Me-1984 was destroyed with the beginning of 1985 (this statement might have some nuance depending on how we treat time). Me-2013 exists now. Therefore we have a situation where I was destroyed but still exist.

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Premise 1 is inaccurate. X no longer exists at all only if all instances of X are destroyed.

If I have a hydrogen atom named Adam, and you have a hydrogen atom named Bryan, then can one of these atoms ever cease to exist as long as the other still exists? If I invent a machine that destroys all the hydrogen atoms in the universe except for Adam, then does Bryan still exist?

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by ErhnamDJ

If I have a hydrogen atom named Adam, and you have a hydrogen atom named Bryan, then can one of these atoms ever cease to exist as long as the other still exists? If I invent a machine that destroys all the hydrogen atoms in the universe except for Adam, then does Bryan still exist?

You're mixing different sets. Adam and Bryan are instances of Hydrogen Atom. Vicky-1984 and Vicky-2012 and XoxA-Vicky-2099 and XoxB-Vicky-2099 are all instances of Vicky. (Obviously using very shorthand definitions/names for everything.)

You destroyed all hydrogen atoms except Adam, so you still have hydrogen atoms (1) in the universe at a given timeslice.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by Anthony

That's not entirely true; it depends on which identity you're talking about. It is entirely possible for things to bind to transferable roles or entities. For example, if I were Count of X, I could either buy something personally, or I could buy something while wearing my Count hat. If, then, the title were transferred to someone else, the first purchase would remain with me, while the second would remain with the title. This does not make 'Count of X' not an identity.

True. One can have several legal identities. But each of them follows space/time continuity. If I would legally get the name Count of X too, I would still not get your property. Unless the king transfers the title from you to me.

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

You're mixing different sets. Adam and Bryan are instances of Hydrogen Atom. Vicky-1984 and Vicky-2012 and XoxA-Vicky-2099 and XoxB-Vicky-2099 are all instances of Vicky. (Obviously using very shorthand definitions/names for everything.)

You destroyed all hydrogen atoms except Adam, so you still have hydrogen atoms (1) in the universe at a given timeslice.

I don't know what any of that means. You're saying that Bryan does still exist if you remove it from space and time, since Adam still exists in space and time, solely because you consider them to be hydrogen atoms?

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by Flyndaran

I'm me. I don't care how you try to say that that perfect copy over there is also me. That's completely wrong, because I know that only I am me.

For example, you get to see with only one (your) set of eyes.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Premise 1 is inaccurate. X no longer exists at all only if all instances of X are destroyed. Me-1984 doesn't exist in 2012, but me-2012 exists in 2012. Me-1984 was destroyed with the beginning of 1985 (this statement might have some nuance depending on how we treat time). Me-2013 exists now. Therefore we have a situation where I was destroyed but still exist.

No. Me-1984 was not destroyed it all. It became Me-1985. Or do you claim that somewhere there is a corpse of Me-1984, and that Me-1985 was created from nothing by God Almighty or some other force capable of creating matter from nothing on january 1st, 1985 ?