Ghosts and Mind Copies - The Identity Question

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

And minds depend on brains. So of brains have unique markers, they leave a 'footprint' on a mind too.

If minds depend on brains, how can a mind that´s transferred to a different brain still be the same? Brains contain lots of unique markers, the entire genetic information in each brain cell, which AFAICT are not copied into a ghost. And identical twins have the same genetic information, but - IMO - nevertheless seperate minds. Or what "unique markers" do you mean ? Under your premises they must not change over time and be part of the information that gets uploaded.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

That's a very interesting set of questions. It might indeed turn out that person-0y.o. and person-18y.o. have practically nothing in common that they don't have in common with most of humanity. Which, if it is indeed the case, we have to accept as a moderately uncomfortable truth. That's the price of having definitions - sticking to them.

What does that mean in practice ? Vicky-0 and Vicky-18 are two seperate persons ? When did the switch occur ? Do the legal heirs of Vicky-0 get the inheritance, as Vicky-0 is no more ? Or, if they are still the same person, are all others Vicky too and co-owners of all Vicky owns ?

[jeff_wilson]

Originally Posted by whswhs

I think that's obviously wrong. I discount the interests of my future self of 2020, yes, but that has nothing to do with our being "two different people"; we're at two different points on the same worldline,

I'm not saying the future self is a different person.

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by jeff_wilson

I'm not saying the future self is a different person.

Well, what are you saying, then? And how is it changed if our criterion for "the same person" is not being on the same worldline, but pattern similarity?

Bill Stoddard

[sir_pudding]

Originally Posted by Pomphis

Brains contain lots of unique markers, the entire genetic information in each brain cell, which AFAICT are not copied into a ghost.

If digital mind emulation is viable at all it has to emulate all aspect of human biology that effect cognition. A "ghost" must logically have a virtual body.

[jeff_wilson]

Originally Posted by whswhs

Well, what are you saying, then? And how is it changed if our criterion for "the same person" is not being on the same worldline, but pattern similarity?

I think I am trying to say that pattern similarity without worldline continuity is insufficient to establish numerical continuity since worldline continuity establishs numerical continuity even when pattern similarity is absent. The infant and the adult do not share the same mental pattern, but no one here is questioning that they are still the same person, right?

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by jeff_wilson

I think I am trying to say that pattern similarity without worldline continuity is insufficient to establish numerical continuity since worldline continuity establishs numerical continuity even when pattern similarity is absent. The infant and the adult do not share the same mental pattern, but no one here is questioning that they are still the same person, right?

(a) I think that everyone here agrees that the newborn you and the present-day you count as the same person.

(b) However, at least one person, molokh, claims that worldline continuity is irrelevant to identity, and that pattern similarity is constitutive of identity.

(c) I believe that this faces us with a dilemma:

either (i) the limited pattern similarity between newborn you and present-day you entails that the two do not count as the same person, contra (a);

or (ii) the limited pattern similarity between newborn you and present-day you is sufficient for the two of you to count as the same person, and therefore newborn you counts as the same person as a lot of other newborns, and present-day you also probably count as the same person as a substantial share of those newborns.

(d) molokh denies that he believes (c)(i), but also does not seem willing to go with (c)(ii); he appeals to the possibility of defining a notion of similarity that is a perfect substitute for worldline continuity in singling out the one and only one newborn who is on your worldline as just happening to have the right amount of similarity, but he has not offered any suggested way of showing this.

(e) Hence his position strikes me as founded more in faith than in reason.

Bill Stoddard

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by Pomphis

If minds depend on brains, how can a mind that´s transferred to a different brain still be the same? Brains contain lots of unique markers, the entire genetic information in each brain cell, which AFAICT are not copied into a ghost. And identical twins have the same genetic information, but - IMO - nevertheless seperate minds. Or what "unique markers" do you mean ? Under your premises they must not change over time and be part of the information that gets uploaded.

I mean unique markers that do have an effect on the mind/ghost, and that are either constant, or change in predictable way, such that they remain meaningful markers.

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by Pomphis

What does that mean in practice ? Vicky-0 and Vicky-18 are two seperate persons ? When did the switch occur ? Do the legal heirs of Vicky-0 get the inheritance, as Vicky-0 is no more ? Or, if they are still the same person, are all others Vicky too and co-owners of all Vicky owns ?

Depends on the criteria specified in the legal contract. I say if a Ghost/AI enters a legal contract which specifies that they want all of their possessions to be transferred to some friend should they ever lose Trait X, let them.

With legal contracts such as 'A will inherit my B upon my death, but only if he marries C until date D', this is nothing new.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by sir_pudding

If digital mind emulation is viable at all it has to emulate all aspect of human biology that effect cognition. A "ghost" must logically have a virtual body.

I agree, but canonically a ghost does not have a fully emulated ghost body, only a simulation of "much of" the body.


THS p.57: If the victim is not rescued, then within a few hours
his brain will dehydrate to the point where it cannot be
read using uploading technology

THS p.78: Memories are encoded within the physical structure
of the brain on the molecular level. Uploading is the
process of copying all this information into a digital form.

THS p.78: A mind emulation is not merely a recording, but a
conscious, self-aware, working digital model of the way
a particular living being’s brain functions. This requires
simulating much of the rest of the body and its environment
as well: “naked consciousness” bereft of context
rapidly becomes insane.