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Old 05-31-2019, 06:35 AM   #1
Icelander
 
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Default US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

I'm looking for guidelines on how fast US local, state and federal law enforcement agencies can respond to perfidious villains whose meticulous, subtle, occult machinations have been disrupted and who find themselves forced to resort to far riskier, ad hoc stratagems, facilitated by sicarios wielding semi-automatic AR-15 type rifles.

Briefly, if an ambulance escorted by one or two police radio cars were attacked by multiple men with rifles, killing 2+ police officers and 2 EMTs, how quickly could a response be mobilized?

In particular, how quickly could Galveston PD and/or the Galveston County Sheriff's Office set up a roadblock on Harborside Drive / State Highway 275, a possible road such an attack would occur at and one logical route to take for the Galveston Causeway, the quickest way off the island on the I-45?

Edit: Actually, the chosen ambush point will be the corner of Galveston's Broadway Street and 71st Street, with the escape route being Broadway Avenue to the west for a short distance before merging into I-45 and heading over the Galveston Causeway to the mainland. This has the advantage, for the OpFor, of mostly eliminating the risk of their target being transported a different route, by hitting the target just after they start their transport, at the intersection which represents the first opportunity to choose between different routes.

It's also only 3.2 miles from the mainland, over the Galveston Causeway on the I-45, and a total of 6 miles by freeway (inc. on and exit ramps) to the extraction spot chosen by the OpFor, with multiple choices of routes, in Bayou Vista, where they will change vehicles and scatter.

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Federal and State Response

As a ruthless ambush of an ambulance and police vehicles using weapons that looked pretty military would probably push a lot of 'terrorism' buttons, how extensive would the law enforcement response become? What agencies would become involved, beyond those who were involved in the original murder and kidnapping investigation that was underway when the attack was made?

Background on the Situation and the Crime

In my Caribbean by Night campaign, Galveston PD discovered six bodies in the Seawall Walmart in Galveston about an hour before midnight, December 27 2018. Some thirty minutes after that, units responded to a report of shots fired in the historic Strand district, near a building adjoining Harborside Drive, with the shots being fired on the 23rd Street and/or a parking lot off it.

Two males, Janus Eremus and Ronald E. Green, were arrested at the scene, suspected of having drugged and kidnapped a young woman, Alice Talbot. Ms. Talbot was rescued, but made only a short statement before being allowed to rest. This was contrary to the wishes of the detectives in charge of the kidnapping case, as it deprived them of crucial information during the vital first hours of the case, but Ms. Talbot is employed by local billionaire J.R. Kessler, who sent a high-powered criminal defense attorney on her behalf and threatened dire legal consequences if the victim were not allowed immediate bed rest and the medical attention of her choice.

In the course of their investigation, Galveston PD has discovered connections between the kidnapping to the six bodies discovered earlier in the Seawall Walmart. The victims were apparently killed somewhere else, 12-18 hours before, and concealed in a back room of the Walmart. Five out of six bodies have been identified, three as employees of the Walmart, one as a tourist and one as a hotel employee from the Hotel Galvez. The sixth is a young woman who may also be a tourist, but the leading theory among the detectives is that she is a prostitute, despite her fingerprints not being in the system.

This case is probably the largest that the Galveston PD has handled in years, Serial killers are rare and six victims found at one location is unusual and dramatic. Galveston PD has jurisdiction, but I'm guessing that the Galveston County Sheriff's Office would cooperate right from the start, as two of the victims lived outside the municipal area of Galveston proper and, in any case, the actual site of the murders might just as likely have been in their jurisdiction.

It is also highly likely that other agencies would provide support, at least, with a possibility that the FBI would claim jurisdiction on the basis of kidnapping charges and/or the likelihood that the victims were transported from elsewhere. The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) are also very likely to be involved, both as forensic support and possibly, through the CID and the Texas Rangers Division, clamoring to be the lead agency.

The Gulf Coast Violent Offender Task Force sounds like it ought to get involved. It's led by the US Marshals and I don't know how that works when there are no known suspects with active warrants, but from reading news stories, it sounds like the GCVOTF would coordinate any necessary manhunt, even if the more technical aspects of the homicide investigation might be in the hands of others.

Where we are in play right now, it is just under 27 hours since the bodies were found, meaning that it is just past midnight on the night before the 29th of December, 2018.

The Galveston PD and the Galveston County Sheriff's Office have just taken one Gwen Delvano into custody, as a person of interest in the case, due to her credit card being used to book an apartment where the two men who were arrested appear to have been staying. Ms. Delvano is to be transported to the UTMB TDCJ Hospital for scans due to a head injury before being processed into the county jail.

A corporate executive by the name of Raul, commanding some dozen men of a South American origin, some of whom have military experience and all of whom are experienced shooters, has been tasked with stopping this. They are armed with personal sidearms and various AR-15 type rifles. With them are two security professionals / PIs in Raul's empoy and a taciturn Russian mechanic with Spetsnaz sniper experience, armed with a Barrett Model 82A1 CQ .50 BMG rifle.

OpFor Personnel
OpFor Vehicle Fleet
OpFor Arsenal
Igor the Spetsnaz sniper

The Kidnapping of Alice Talbot
Detail on the Situation at Midnight
The Law Enforcement Officers Present Where 'Gwen Delvano' is Taken Into Custody
Ambulance Used to Transport 'Gwen Delvano'
More on the Ambulance and EMTs
Some Guesses as to What Might Happen if the Ambush Succeeds
Threat of Law Enforcement Helicopters

Areas of Responsibility and Chain of Command On the First Day of the Investigation - I'm looking for more on the state-level response; Texas Department of Public Safety, inc. Texas Rangers. Comments?

Edit: See new post with updated situation

Less than 24 hours after these events, the police response and manhunt will grow even more substantial, as the PCs reveal an attempt to smuggle 42 women into Houston as part of an apparent human trafficking ring and a firefight between the crew of the ship, police and Good Samaritans leaves some 21 dead.

I'm wondering how wide-ranging and extensive the response can get and what problems that might cause for villains or PCs trying to do something out of sight within 200 miles of the Galveston-Houston area.
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Old 05-31-2019, 07:47 AM   #2
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

~20 minutes is probably a good response time for most urban police unless the local police were already on alert. If the victims are high profile or other police, or if the incident is in a downtown area, you can probably halve the response time. If the police are on alert for a potential atrack, you could halve the response time again.

Closing an connection to an interstate road is a completely different story. That usually requires permission from the governor of a state, as it could potentially be interfering with interstate commerce. At the best of times, you are probably talking an hour (local and state roads can be done with a call to the mayor/county comissioner, probably ~15 minutes). A blockade is a different story, as that assumes a temporary interruption of travel, and could be a reaction to a pursuit in progress).
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Old 05-31-2019, 09:54 AM   #3
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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Originally Posted by AlexanderHowl View Post
~20 minutes is probably a good response time for most urban police unless the local police were already on alert. If the victims are high profile or other police, or if the incident is in a downtown area, you can probably halve the response time. If the police are on alert for a potential atrack, you could halve the response time again.
Well, Galveston PD are probably not specifically on the alert for a paramilitary ambush of an ambulance and the police squad car (or cars) escorting it. They and the Galveston County Sheriff are engaged in a huge investigation, kidnapping and six murders, which has been ongoing since the night before, but the kidnapper and his suspected accomplice are already in custody. There are other persons of interest in the case, an unknown male and the woman Gwen Delvano, but they might be only witnesses or tagentially related. At the moment we are, in play, the police have no special reason to assume that anyone connected to the murders is at all likely to attack police.

The person of interest they've just arrested, Gwen Delvano, is unarmed and has not been tied to any violent crime. At the moment, she is suspected of having a connection of some sort to Janus Eremus, the probable killer (already in custody), but she might as well be a potential victim as an accomplice. As for a possible third killer, his existence is purely hypothetical, based on eyewitness testimony of the probable killer having been seen with another man on the day before the murders.

Basically, Galveston PD and the Sheriff's Office are working overtime collecting evidence, formally identjfying the victims, chasing leads and trying to track down everyone who might have seen the killer around the period when forensics estimates time of death for the six victims, but most of them believe they already have their man and any other persons of interest will primarily be useful as witnesses (who might otherwise catch accessory charges).

Only those officers who think they are living in a movie would seriously expect that a squad of paramilitary sicarios would ambush them as they transport a person of interest in the case to a hospital. Frankly, the NPC in charge of the sicarios considers the idea insane, but given that he was told in no uncertain terms what his fate would be if he does not bring that person to his superiors, he is weighing the certain, grotesque doom that his mysterious masters visit on those who displease them against the almost certain death or imrpisonment that he invites by attacking US law enforcement in such a dramatic fashion.

As the NPC is smart, cool-headed, used to thinking on his feet and has relevant skills like Intelligence Analysis, Streetwise and Tactics, I wanted to see if there is even a practical way to escape to the mainland before the way is blocked by police roadblocks. If there is no way to escape, the NPC will try to flee from his vengeful masters rather than go through with a plan without any chance of success.

Obcious negatives include the stations for Galveston PD and the Sheriff's Office (as well as the County Jail) being located right next to Harborside Drive and any place chosen for the ambush probably being within a mile or two of these two police stations. Also, there doesn't seem to be any other way off the island that is practical for a group of strangers, just after midnight, than driving out over the causeway. Which pretty much makes it a race between the paramilitary shooters trying to get over bridge and leave I-45 on the mainland, where there are options for alternate routes, and the police response attempting to set up a roadblock at the exit to I-45 and the causeway.

If the sicarios do execute this ambush to rescue their target from police custody, the victims will include more than one EMT and more than one police officer. Gwen Delvano, removed with force from police custody, would also go from 'person of interest' to 'prime suspect' in not only the six outstanding murders and the kidnapping, but also of the homicides caused by the firefight where she escaped. It would obviously be a huge deal, a suspected mass murderer / serial killer escaping from custody through a paramilitary / terrorist style attack on an ambulance and police vehicles, complete with multiple officers down.

But no matter how important, it would still come as a shock and coordinating the official response would be harder, not easier, at least at first, by the numbers of responders wanting to contribute. Sheriffs and local PDs often do not share tactical radio frequencies and risk blue-on-blue incidents if everyone simply barges into a firefight at night. Adding several state and federal agencies to the mix will not help in the first few seconds and minutes, not until a chain of command, communication network and liason protocols are worked out.

Working out the distances, the shooters can make it over the causeway to the mainland in about ten minutes. Is that fast enough to outrun a police response to block it?

Quote:
Originally Posted by AlexanderHowl View Post
Closing an connection to an interstate road is a completely different story. That usually requires permission from the governor of a state, as it could potentially be interfering with interstate commerce. At the best of times, you are probably talking an hour (local and state roads can be done with a call to the mayor/county comissioner, probably ~15 minutes). A blockade is a different story, as that assumes a temporary interruption of travel, and could be a reaction to a pursuit in progress).
I-45 is completely within Texas, but, of course, it is probably used for all sorts of interstate commerce.

It's a Friday night, actually just after midnight on the Saturday of December 29, 2018, and it's possible that residents and tourists staying in the Houston metropolitan area are still returning from bars and other entertainment on Galveston Island. The Moody Gardens close at 22:00, with their Festival of Lights, but there are no doubt entertainments which are open longer on the island. Most tourists probably stay in hotels in Galveston but Texas City and various suburbs of Houston might offer cheaper Christmas rates for hotel rooms or Airbnb.

Of course, if Galveston is like most harbors, road transports to and from the port mostly happens at night, so there might be significant truck traffick over the I-45.
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Old 05-31-2019, 10:35 AM   #4
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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Originally Posted by Icelander View Post
W


I-45 is completely within Texas, but, of course, it is probably used for all sorts of interstate commerce.
.
If it's not obvious the "I" designation always indicates a road that's part of the Interstate highway system (and funded in that manner). Where the money starts out from decides where the legal authority ends up with.

I-45 isn't unique. I believe I-16 goes only from Savannah to Macon, all within Georgia.

State roads get an "SR" number (at least in Florida and adjoining states).
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Old 05-31-2019, 12:43 PM   #5
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

Quote:
Originally Posted by Icelander View Post
Briefly, if an ambulance escorted by one or two police radio cars were attacked by multiple men with rifles, killing 2+ police officers and 2 EMTs, how quickly could a response be mobilized?
The vital thing for getting a response started is a clear and accurate report that there's serious firepower being used, and where the incident is. You need to decide how successful the attackers were at preventing a report from the police and ambulance staff. Without a report, people will call 911, but it will take longer for the situation to make sense back at the police HQs.
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Old 05-31-2019, 01:05 PM   #6
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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Originally Posted by Fred Brackin View Post
If it's not obvious the "I" designation always indicates a road that's part of the Interstate highway system (and funded in that manner). Where the money starts out from decides where the legal authority ends up with.

I-45 isn't unique. I believe I-16 goes only from Savannah to Macon, all within Georgia.

State roads get an "SR" number (at least in Florida and adjoining states).
Very good.

What kind of authorization do the first responders, Galveston PD and/or Galveston County Sheriff, or any other possible LE agency that becomes involved, require to put up a police roadblock on the I-45 within the city of Galveston, in Galveston County?

Assuming that our nefarious NPCs estimate the risk of going through with their foolhardy, ad hoc scheme is less than having their masters come after them for appropriate punishment, I've located the only spot for an ambush where the OpFor can be reasonably certain that the police will drive through with their prisoner. On the corner of Broadway Street and 71st Street, right next to the I-45, as from here, those transporting the prisoner have a choice of two routes. Before that point, the choices mostly boil down to which direction to take on Broadway Street, away from the police station, County Jail and hospital, or toward them.

This means that the spot is almost certainly a possible ambush site, as any alternate route that diverges from Broadway Street earlier than this would be extremely odd, as it would just be adding distance for no benefit. Neither local cops nor ambulance drivers are likely to take a detour from the most efficient route that leads to their destination for no purpose. But Google Maps shows a branching out of possibilities after this corner, with more than one route being logical, depending on personal preference or possibly departmental protocol in re freeways vs. local roads. As the OpFor doesn't have enough information to know for sure which route their targets might choose, it makes it necessary to hit them here or not at all.

Also, this site is practical because the OpFor can fairly easily get to the other side of the freeway, as the 71st Street goes under it and leads conveniently to an on ramp less than a quarter mile away, putting them on the I-45 and headed for freedom. In fact, even driving at legal highway speeds and dealing with average traffic, the OpFor can leave the I-45 on the mainland only six minutes after they secure their package and start their escape and evasion drill.

Of course, while by GURPS rules and even technically in real training exercises (shooting man-sized targets through car windows at 10-30 yards with red-dot sighted Bushmaster XM-15 QRC, Colt LE9620 and DPMS Panther Oracle rifles is not technically hard), the OpFor should be able to shoot 2-4 armed police from ambush and remove one girl in less than a minute of Aim, All-Out Attack, Attack and Move maneuvers (technically, probably 10-15 seconds if everyone moves like hostage rescue operators), the NPC considering this crazy plan realizes that his sicarios are not Delta or HRT.

Service in the Bolivian or Pervian military, in the best case scenario followed by security work for Academi/Xe, Triple Canopy or Aegis LLC, does not produce SOF-quality troops. Even less so does belonging to violent gangs or militant groups, even if someone was hand-picked as an effective enforcer. In any case, while the OpFor sicarios have some experience working together in paramilitary teams, the leader's three best men are not used to working with the the imported shooters. The OpFor leader would be happy to be moving in two minutes after the first shot and fears that four minutes are quite possible (but must be avoided, if they want to succeed).

The negatives to the chosen ambush site are primarily two. 1.3 miles to the Galveston PD police station and ca 350-400 yards to the moored yacht Penemue, filled with PCs and the kind of armed security guards a billionaire with scary enemies employs.

However, assuming that the PCs and their NPC allies decline to fire at anyone 350+ yards away in the dark, when they can't be sure of identifying friend or foe, the most likely point of failure for the OpFor's rescue plan is being stopped on the I-45, before they reach the mainland where there are multiple potential routes and law enforcement will have a hard time blocking them all.

How long will it take for police cars to block the north-bound traffic on the Galveston Causeway?

Who needs to sign off on doing so?
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Old 05-31-2019, 01:59 PM   #7
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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The vital thing for getting a response started is a clear and accurate report that there's serious firepower being used, and where the incident is. You need to decide how successful the attackers were at preventing a report from the police and ambulance staff. Without a report, people will call 911, but it will take longer for the situation to make sense back at the police HQs.
Because of the necessity of hitting the vehicle moving their target before there is a chance that the police or EMTs will take a different route, the OpFor are essentially proposing to attack before the ambulance has driven even half a mile from where they started, at the berth where the Penemue is moored. In a direct line, it's only 350-400 yards, although, fortunate for the OpFor, there is no line of sight (several houses and some trees block it thoroughly), and anyone driving has to go around water and private gardens.

What this means for the OpFor is that they'd hit the ambulance, and however many police vehicles escort it, only about a minute or two after they left their fellow officers on the pier. Well, most likely, the officers not heading away would be on the Penemue, talking to PCs, not just sitting in their cars, but still, everyone; PCs, police officers and Penemue security staff, is going to hear a 20" barrel .50 BMG firing three to five shots in about ten seconds less than a quarter mile away. Ironically, the PCs may not have Familiarity with .50 BMG rifles, but the former Navy SEALs, USCG MSST members and USASF operators among Kessler's security will sure as hell recognise an anti-material rifle.

And 50+ 5.56x45mm rounds fired in close succession will also register pretty clearly over the occasional sounds of nighttime traffic, at least to anyone listening. So someone at the Penemue will call in, even if, by some miracle, the OpFor managed to drop everyone around their target without anyone managing to report the attack.

Granted, it's possible that the Galveston PD will not receive enough information to determine immediately if the ambulance and accompanying police vehicles were attacked on Broadway Street or if they had gotten on the I-45 next to it. This matters, of course, in exactly which route the first responders would take, especially the officers at the Penemue, who'd probably want to rush to the scene. Still, the first unit to get visual contact with the ambulance can confirm that.

Also, all local cops with any experience or sense will immediately know that the only escape by car that makes sense is over the Galveston Causeway by the I-45, so the authorities will know what they need to close as soon as they confirm what happened.

The problem for the first responders is that the total number of cops at Penemue is only eight, two Galveston PD radio cars with four patrolmen, one Galveston County Sheriff's Office radio car with two deputies and a couple of Galveston PD detectives driving an unmarked car. So, regardless of whether one or two squad cars follow the ambulance, what remains is not really a credible rescue force, as they are outnumbered by the OpFor and outgunned. To have a chance, they need reinforcements from the two police stations, which are about 1.3 miles away as the raven flies.
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Old 05-31-2019, 02:15 PM   #8
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

Response time to an armed incident is fast, probably 20 minutes. Maybe less if police were injured. Cops oddly find themselves available to respond faster if one of their own is hit. If this was a high-risk transport the police would have had back-up ready, the response time may be cut down by 5 minutes and could include SWAT.

The police may not have clear enough Intel to cut the attackers in a barricade. They may make an error in assuming their route or just decide they're not certain enough of where they perpetrators are going to sacrifice units that could be searching for them.

I don't know that the police would choose to block traffic to stop guys with assault rifles. They wouldn't want more police injured. They'd need to be sure they could minimize loss of life before they forced a confrontation. More likely they'd follow the vehicle with a helicopter until they can use a swat team in a controlled area.

If they stole the ambulance it's going to be easy to track. It's a big white truck with a number on top for IDing from the sky. They'll be able to track them with a helicopter or drone from so far away there's almost no chance the perpetrators will spot them.
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Old 05-31-2019, 02:41 PM   #9
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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Very good.

What kind of authorization do the first responders, Galveston PD and/or Galveston County Sheriff, or any other possible LE agency that becomes involved, require to put up a police roadblock on the I-45 within the city of Galveston, in Galveston County?
Possibly a lot, but why would they do that? The normal response is that you whistle up a dozen police cars and a couple helicopters and form a moving roadblock (you can find many examples of that sort of thing; for example, I saw this pop up last week).
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Of course, while by GURPS rules and even technically in real training exercises (shooting man-sized targets through car windows at 10-30 yards with red-dot sighted Bushmaster XM-15 QRC, Colt LE9620 and DPMS Panther Oracle rifles is not technically hard), the OpFor should be able to shoot 2-4 armed police from ambush and remove one girl in less than a minute of Aim, All-Out Attack, Attack and Move maneuvers (technically, probably 10-15 seconds if everyone moves like hostage rescue operators)
Nowhere near that easy. There are a series of problems:
  1. Cars and vans can be controlled without exposing yourself. You can't really steer, but if you make it three blocks in a straight line, that's still plenty of distance to make a big mess of the ambusher's plans.
  2. Cars and vans don't actually stop when the driver is killed.
  3. Many vans have access to the driver's compartment from the back, meaning anyone in the van is potentially able to replace the driver, and in fact do so while never being visible to people outside the vehicle.
  4. While reactions under fire are quite erratic, there's a high chance of the reaction being to accelerate to try and get out of the area.
  5. The end result is, if you manage to stop the vehicle at all, it's likely to be hundreds of yards from where the ambush occurred, and is likely to involve a high speed crash. Which is less than optimal if you want to rescue someone alive and intact.
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Old 05-31-2019, 03:06 PM   #10
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Default Re: US Law Enforcement Response, Time, Scale and Coordination (Galveston, TX)

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Possibly a lot, but why would they do that? The normal response is that you whistle up a dozen police cars and a couple helicopters and form a moving roadblock (you can find many examples of that sort of thing; for example, I saw this pop up last week).
Yes, I should have been clearer. The OpFor is worried about any police response that prevents automobiles from crossing the Galveston Causeway, over to the mainland, regardless of whether it's done using vehicles or barricades.

Originally, I was not sure whether the OpFor would plan on reaching the mainland before an effective response or whether they'd explore hiding in Galveston until the authorities had to open the bridge to traffic (the NPC leader is not known to the authorities and the target is known by a wrong name and a poor photo). However, for a variety of reasons, I think that the latter plan is impractical, so only speed and violence of action remain to be explored.

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Nowhere near that easy. There are a series of problems:
  1. Cars and vans can be controlled without exposing yourself. You can't really steer, but if you make it three blocks in a straight line, that's still plenty of distance to make a big mess of the ambusher's plans.
  2. Cars and vans don't actually stop when the driver is killed.
  3. Many vans have access to the driver's compartment from the back, meaning anyone in the van is potentially able to replace the driver, and in fact do so while never being visible to people outside the vehicle.
  4. While reactions under fire are quite erratic, there's a high chance of the reaction being to accelerate to try and get out of the area.
  5. The end result is, if you manage to stop the vehicle at all, it's likely to be hundreds of yards from where the ambush occurred, and is likely to involve a high speed crash. Which is less than optimal if you want to rescue someone alive and intact.
Well, failure is always a possibility, but the ambush is meant to start with the Spetsnaz sniper using his M82A1 CQ to disable the ambulance engine, then the driver (if practical) and only then engage any police vehicles.

After the ambulance loses power, the OpFor truck cuts it off, hopefully resulting in a relatively soft stop, especially as the ambulance will hopefully be going at a fairly modest speed, in case they mean to turn at this corner (50/50 chance). Ideally, the OpFor shooters can then move in on foot to enter the ambulance and deal with any police in other vehicles they didn't hit in their fire from ambush. If they fail to stop the ambulance at the exact right spot, they have two other vehicles to move to the right area.
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