Ghosts and Mind Copies - The Identity Question

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Yes, it would be fair to 'deny' contractual rights to Vicky-500, because the contract was written in such a way

I forgot: it´s not just or even mainly "contracts". It´s also and even more "laws". Spouses, ex-spouses and children often have statutory rights to maintenance. How should the statutes be written ? Who gets the money, and who has to pay ? And similarily, who is statutory heir of whom ?

And I still do not now which of the 500 Vickys I am now married to, as an employer which one I have to pay, and as a landlord which one I have to give the keys.

One could have a rule "In the case of multiple copies being created, a notary public shall determine randomly which one is to be treated as the original. All others shall be treated as new persons." But would that be fair for example in cases where new copies were created without the consent of the first ghost ? Let´s say, an old backup being activated by accident ?*

Or one could say that the first copy is to be treated as the original and all later copies as new persons. But what if the first copy is stored as a back-up and the second, made a microsecond later, is downloaded into a new body ?

And all such approaches would of course be inconsistent with the claim that all are the same person and require that they are defined as different persons. But without that, I see a legal nightmare.

*Which brings up another question: are Vicky-backup2080 and Vicky-2100 the same person ? What if Vicky married in 2090 ? If Vicky-2100 dies, and Vicky-backup2080 is activated, is he married ?

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by whswhs

That actually is not the view I hold, by the way; I believe that it's possible in principle to create a virtual brain that would be conscious. But I think that, if you made one based on my brain according to the methods in THS, it would not be MY consciousness, any more than, if you made a virtual alimentary canal based on mine in exhaustive detail, the resulting digestion would be MY digestion. My identity is tied to my body.

I've been watching this thread for fifteen or so pages, waiting for some point to jump in. Doesn't look like that's ever going to happen, since this is exactly the same point I would be making.

I am my body. All the little (really little) bits of matter I have accumulated, all glommed together in what I refer to as a 'body.'

To look at it another way, let us go to my shotgun. It is mine, the same as my body. I would not say that it is me, though, as I would with my body. But it is still mine. I am the owner of it.

Now, say someone scans my shotgun and uses the information obtained in that scan to make a copy (using entirely different matter). Is that new shotgun mine? No. It has different qualities. It exists in a different place and is made of different matter. It did not come to be in the same way as the one that is mine. It does not meet any conceivable standard of 'mine,' but meets every standard of 'not-mine.'

In the same way, making a copy of my body does not mean that said copy is mine, or me. It is made of different matter than I am.

And my understanding is that it is not even physically possible to make it exactly the same--something about a Heisenberg fellow.

This is a matter of definitions. I would define 'me' as the matter that makes up my body (particularly my brain), in the pattern that said matter would refer to as 'me.' It may be possible to make something that resembles my body. But that thing is not me. Because it is not made of my matter, and because the matter that makes up 'me' would not refer to that thing as 'me.'

I think this is, in essence, the same as Bill's position.

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by Pomphis

But do you claim that Vicky-Upload and every later copy is legally a newborn ? And must wait 18 years before it can vote ? According to you the ghost of Vicky-2010 is the same person and has the same age. According to the worldline model it is a new person - but may very well be legally an adult. There is nothing in "worldline" about just when somebody is legally an adult. So it would not be inconsistent at all to legally assign the age of the uploaded person to the new person and treat this copy as a dangerous adult.

I thought we were discussing my vs. your PoV. If it is a different person, it is a 'newborn'; if it is the same person, it has the same legal age as the initial instance.

Originally Posted by Pomphis

Now you are introducing a completely new concept: sub-persons. Please define and explain whether they are persons (with all rights thereof) or something less (in which way ?). What is the relationship between them persons and sub-persons, and between sub-persons ?

They are informational instances falling within the set of the person in discussion. They certainly have the same inalienable rights as their superset in general (i.e. you may not torture or kill them, they have the right to dignity, privacy, freedom of thought etc.). However, it is not yet clear to me how interaction between the entities within a person should be resolved. They certainly inherit the properties of the set (e.g. if the K kills a person, then subsequently all ghosts K1, K2 etc. made after that point are killers, unless they are modified in such a way as not to be).

Originally Posted by Pomphis

In which case Vicky-500 is as entitled to all contractual rights as Vicky-1. Remember, according to you they are the same person.

If the contracts are written that way, sure. Just as if a person gains a split personality with both halves being equally dominant and equally representative of the original personality, all contractual rights are automatically inherited by all personalities residing in the same body.

Originally Posted by Pomphis

The very act of distinguishing between them by assigning different rights to different ghosts makes the claim that they are the same person nonsensical.

Why? Vicky-0yo and Vicky-18yo are the same person by the worldline legal system, but only the latter may legally drink anything with more alcohol than found in beer.

Originally Posted by Pomphis

AFAIK all western countries have such laws today. That´s how we deal with "innocent due to insanity" cases.

Innocent due to insanity is not the same thing as editing a person who didn't do anything (that is, if you follow the worldline approach with all new instances being legally newborns).

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

However, it is not yet clear to me how interaction between the entities within a person should be resolved.

"Entities within a person"? What are these entities?

You've insisted that identity can only be defined by similarity of information content within certain specified limits; in particular, that a person can only be defined by their information content. Fine, that's a premise.

Now all of a sudden you're talking about entities.

Are entities also defined by similarity of information content? If so, then since they're within a person, presumably they're defined by narrower specificity of information content. Why is there a need for two levels of specificity in a legal system? What does the narrower level do that the wider level does not? Or, conversely, why only two levels, and not an unlimited number?

Or are entities not defined by similarity of information content, but does each entity have its own worldline that uniquely defines it? If so, haven't you just brought back in the "worldline continuity" standard of personal identity by the back door? I'm not sure what we gain if all we're doing is changing the legal name from "person" to "entity," if the concept of a unique individual with a unique worldline is still part of the conceptual structure of the law. It doesn't seem like a substantial change at all, but only a nominal one.

Please clarify.

Bill Stoddard

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Vicky-0yo and Vicky-18yo are the same person by the worldline legal system, but only the latter may legally drink anything with more alcohol than found in beer.

(a) This neatly illustrates differences of cultural assumptions. Here in California, it is not legal for Vicky-18 to drink even beer; the drinking age is 21, and beer is in the same legal category as vodka.

(b) It's true that the rights of an individual as defined by worldline continuity are not solely defined by which worldline they are on. But pattern similarity is not the only other option. In fact, I don't see any way to define an age limit as a question of pattern similarity; if it were that, wouldn't the logical approach be to make people take some sort of psychological test before getting their license to drink?

The question has never been one of "what is the legal basis for the rights of an individual?" Rather, it's "how do you identify an individual in a legal code based on the following concept of personal identity?" Once you've identified them, other concerns may come into play.

Bill Stoddard

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by whswhs

"Entities within a person"? What are these entities?

You've insisted that identity can only be defined by similarity of information content within certain specified limits; in particular, that a person can only be defined by their information content. Fine, that's a premise.

Now all of a sudden you're talking about entities.

Are entities also defined by similarity of information content? If so, then since they're within a person, presumably they're defined by narrower specificity of information content. Why is there a need for two levels of specificity in a legal system? What does the narrower level do that the wider level does not? Or, conversely, why only two levels, and not an unlimited number?

Or are entities not defined by similarity of information content, but does each entity have its own worldline that uniquely defines it? If so, haven't you just brought back in the "worldline continuity" standard of personal identity by the back door? I'm not sure what we gain if all we're doing is changing the legal name from "person" to "entity," if the concept of a unique individual with a unique worldline is still part of the conceptual structure of the law. It doesn't seem like a substantial change at all, but only a nominal one.

Please clarify.

Bill Stoddard

I'm not saying there are necessarily only two levels. But being a flawed human, I think in terms of adapting that which exists, and not in terms of building from scratch.

I find ghost 'branching' a natural consequence of ghost copying in general.

Also, I'm not for just renaming persons to entities. Instead, I'm for treating persons as sets and not as indivisible 'atoms'.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

They are informational instances falling within the set of the person in discussion. They certainly have the same inalienable rights as their superset in general (i.e. you may not torture or kill them, they have the right to dignity, privacy, freedom of thought etc.). However, it is not yet clear to me how interaction between the entities within a person should be resolved. They certainly inherit the properties of the set (e.g. if the K kills a person, then subsequently all ghosts K1, K2 etc. made after that point are killers, unless they are modified in such a way as not to be).

Just what are "entities within a person" ? According to you they are _the same person_.

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

If the contracts are written that way, sure. Just as if a person gains a split personality with both halves being equally dominant and equally representative of the original personality, all contractual rights are automatically inherited by all personalities residing in the same body.

Huh ? Why is the body suddenly relevant ? So far you argued that identity depends on the mind, and defined the mind by informational content. But that makes the mind independent of any body and permits multiple minds in multiple bodies, all of which are the same person.

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by whswhs

(a) This neatly illustrates differences of cultural assumptions. Here in California, it is not legal for Vicky-18 to drink even beer; the drinking age is 21, and beer is in the same legal category as vodka.

We had a recent law change that puts beer age down to 16+, but IIRC vodka is 21+ just as in California. I'm not sure, but I heard that the 'rougher' energy drinks are limited to 12+ or 14+.

Originally Posted by whswhs

(b) It's true that the rights of an individual as defined by worldline continuity are not solely defined by which worldline they are on. But pattern similarity is not the only other option. In fact, I don't see any way to define an age limit as a question of pattern similarity; if it were that, wouldn't the logical approach be to make people take some sort of psychological test before getting their license to drink?

Psychological test and a biological too. In fact, not all cases where different instances of the same person already have different rights present in real life are directly related to age. For instance, Vicky-23 to Vicky-25 had the obligation to work in school #158 of Kyiv, but not Vicky-26 nor V22.

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by ErhnamDJ

And my understanding is that it is not even physically possible to make it exactly the same--something about a Heisenberg fellow.

That's a side track to my mind. molokh has made a point of "similarity" as his criterion, not exact replication.

What I've been arguing is that he adopts a very wide set of limits of similarity for some purposes, but a much narrower set for others, in a way that makes no sense on his own premises, but just happens to fairly closely replicate the conclusions of a worldline continuity view of personal identity.

Bill Stoddard

[ErhnamDJ]

Originally Posted by whswhs

That's a side track to my mind. molokh has made a point of "similarity" as his criterion, not exact replication.

I'm having a difficult time parsing that position.

Criterion for what?

Certainly it can't be for 'sameness,' as that would require exactness, rather than 'similarity.'

In other words, for something to be the same as something else requires it to be exactly the same. It must share all of the same qualities.

If it does not share all of the same qualities (position in space, which matter makes up its parts, etc), then it cannot be said to be the same. Which does lead, correctly, to the use of the word 'similar' in describing the resulting creation in this instance. But said being cannot correctly be described as 'the same.' This is a function of the language, and cannot logically be denied.

I will attempt to demonstrate (for my own sake), the exact example as I understand it, so that I will have a starting point from which to discuss. Note that I am not familiar with 'Transhuman Space,' though I do have some knowledge of transhumanism. I'm going off of what I have picked up from reading this thread. Here goes:

So, what we have is a machine. It can analyze the structures of a heap of matter that we refer to as a 'human' and in doing so make a working model of this 'human' inside a computing device.

But to analyze those structures, it must turn the matter formerly a 'human' into something that would more aptly be described as 'puree.'

Do I have that right?

What I've been arguing is that he adopts a very wide set of limits of similarity for some purposes, but a much narrower set for others, in a way that makes no sense on his own premises, but just happens to fairly closely replicate the conclusions of a worldline continuity view of personal identity.

He mentioned a set of axioms which led to his conclusions, though I do not recall seeing them posted. Were those actually posted? If they were, we could begin by looking at those.

Molokh, would you please post those for me, if you have not yet done so (a rather difficult sentence to phrase with the name at the start)? :)