Ghosts and Mind Copies - The Identity Question

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by whswhs

Fine. In your terms, I consider myself to be a human being, and I want to survive as a human being. I do not consider "survival" as a person to have much value.

Why not?

Here I am in this room. Suppose that, through advanced technology, some alien or time traveler or other entity creates another physical entity that is a very close duplicate of me, with the same DNA and the same memories, indistinguishable from me by the kind of tests that interest you. And suppose he comes into the room.

I can distinguish him from me perfectly easily, by a test that I can perform perfectly well: I look up from my chair and see him standing, say, by the door, not in the same place I'm in. "I'm always here, but sometimes [he] goes away," to paraphrase Heinlein. He can't be in the same place as me, so he's not me.

Or, to put it in terms of what you seem to want to talk about: Here I am, a nexus of ongoing information processing that updates the "person" you identify me as on a continuing basis. That information processing is taking place largely within my physical brain. The other guy over there by the door has a different brain, which is doing its own ongoing information processing and its own updating. The two brains are not connected with a channel of sufficiently high bandwidth to be closely correlated; at the level at which the two persons are changing, they are changing in different ways. We cannot say that there is ONE process of updating going on, because there plainly is not.

And because of that, I see through my eyes, and not his, and he sees through his eyes, and not mine. And if his creator THEN vaporizes my brain, I will not suddenly start seeing through his eyes. I will never see anything again. He will see me die, and I won't. There are two different points of view. And my point of view is tied to my ongoing updating, which is tied to my physical brain, which is tied to my body. I don't see any way to separate them.

And my point of view is also my nexus of decision making. I make my decisions from its perspective, by criteria of what's important from it. My decisions favor me, and not him; his decisions will favor him, and not me. Neither of us will treat the other as interchangeably equivalent. I may think he's an abomination who ought to be destroyed, or wish him the best possible life; but I won't give him my bank card.

Bill Stoddard

What you describe is a case of a complex system trying to describe itself, including its inputs.

The realization that this entity in the room with a different PoV is also me is akin to realizing that the fellow in a different continent with a different skin color is also human. Our closed mindedness, which had its reasons for existence (but becomes outdated as civilization develops), prevents us from accepting it. This denial is one of the many reasons why there are humans who see transhumanism as horrifying.

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

I assume you agree that Vicky-1985 and Vicky-2000 are the same person. Vicky-2000 has just finished school. Vicky-1999 obviously didn't yet. If you get to pick one of the two, obviously you will find that only one of them is eligible to matriculate into a university.

Yes. There is something called "time". Persons and things in general change over time. But remember that _you_ are the one who claims that only informational content counts, wheras I am with Bill WRT worldlines. So you ought to argue that Vicky-1999 and Vicky-2000 are not the same person, as the informational content is different, whereas for me they are the same person. Which brings back my snapshot: if only informational content counts, one is a person always only for a fraction of a second, and then one is replaced by a new and different person.

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Similarly, if you're a judge with precognition powers, you know Dexter-1y.o. and Dexter-30y.o. are the same person, but you may only condemn the latter, only the latter has committed any crimes, while both of them are identified as Dexter Morgan.

That´s a completely different issue, and again consider "time": we only punish crimes that already been committed and are therefore part of the criminal´s past. And again, according to your position Dexter-1 and Dexter-30 are not the same person. Actually, according to your position Dexter-(30 who just murdered) and Dexter-(30+5 minutes who murdered 5 minutes ago) cannot be the same person, as during those 5 minutes information content changed. So can you punish the second Dexter for a crime the first committed ?

[Pomphis]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

The realization that this entity in the room with a different PoV is also me .

But if the POV is different the informational content of the mind is different. So how can you be the same person if the informational content is what counts ?

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

What you describe is a case of a complex system trying to describe itself, including its inputs.

The realization that this entity in the room with a different PoV is also me is akin to realizing that the fellow in a different continent with a different skin color is also human. Our closed mindedness, which had its reasons for existence (but becomes outdated as civilization develops), prevents us from accepting it. This denial is one of the many reasons why there are humans who see transhumanism as horrifying.

You keep coming back to the assumption that "is also me" is equivalent to "is also human": That is, to treating "me" as being about what kind of entity something is, and not about what worldline the entity is on. But the only reason to have the pronouns "I" and "you" is to distinguish the source and the recipient of a signal as referred to within the content of the signal. That is what those pronouns mean. And source and recipient are distinguishable because they are in different places and times—or, in the relativistic language I have been using, they are on different worldlines. If they were not, there would be no point in having the pronoun "me" in the first place, and, indeed, no point in sending signals at all. Your stated model denies the very assumptions that are necessary to define its terms and thus is inherently logically meaningless.

Moreover, in such expressions as "closed mindedness" and "outdated," you seem to suggest that valuing oneself as a singular entity with a singular worldline is somehow unworthy and to be transcended. But values not only are, but must be and ought to be egocentric. The only context in which it makes sense to value anything is the existence of living organisms, and living organisms act to secure both their own continued existence (which they value because it is theirs) and the propagation of their qualitative identities or, in other words, their genetic information (which they value because it is their information). They don't treat themselves and other organisms as interchangeable. What you are calling for as transhuman is not an evolution to a higher stage of life, but the denial of the very nature of life as such, and with it of any possibility of valuing anything.

And, ironically, in determinedly maintaining your own view in the matter against those of other people who hold different views, you are yourself being egocentric in exactly the way you decry; you are consistently refusing to enter into the viewpoint of people who think differently than you do. This is contrary to your position—but exactly what I would expect, believing as I do that egocentricity is inherent in having values at all.

Bill Stoddard

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by Pomphis

Yes. There is something called "time". Persons and things in general change over time. But remember that _you_ are the one who claims that only informational content counts, wheras I am with Bill WRT worldlines. So you ought to argue that Vicky-1999 and Vicky-2000 are not the same person, as the informational content is different, whereas for me they are the same person. Which brings back my snapshot: if only informational content counts, one is a person always only for a fraction of a second, and then one is replaced by a new and different person.

I'm arguing that if there is precedent exist that the informational difference between V-1984 and V-2010 is acceptable for being the same person, then so is the difference between V-2099a and V-2099b.

Originally Posted by Pomphis

That´s a completely different issue, and again consider "time": we only punish crimes that already been committed and are therefore part of the criminal´s past. And again, according to your position Dexter-1 and Dexter-30 are not the same person. Actually, according to your position Dexter-(30 who just murdered) and Dexter-(30+5 minutes who murdered 5 minutes ago) cannot be the same person, as during those 5 minutes information content changed. So can you punish the second Dexter for a crime the first committed ?

It's actually unclear if it is more important whether the crime has been committed within the jurisdiction's current timeframe, or whether the person has committed the crime within his/her/its/their timeframe. Otherwise, same as above paragraph.

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

I'm arguing that if there is precedent exist that the informational difference between V-1984 and V-2010 is acceptable for being the same person, then so is the difference between V-2099a and V-2099b.

But the point is that "V-1984 and V-2010 are the same person" follows from my premises (and Pomphis's) about worldlines being determinative of identity; we would accept radical changes in information content as being consistent with being "the same." (Comparison: If I completely erase every single file on my external hard drive, and then put entirely new files on it, it's still the same hard drive.) You do not accept worldlines being determinative of identity. Therefore your only possible criterion is similarity of information content. And the information content in V-1984 and V-2010 is substantially different. Your belief that they are "the same" is parasitic on a conceptual scheme that you disavow; it does not make any sense in your own conceptual scheme.

What we have here is two different axiom systems, like Euclidean and spherical geometry. And it's important to reach conclusions in each one from its own assumptions. If you're talking about spherical geometry, you don't get to suddenly bring up "parallel lines" as if the notion were unproblematic.

Bill Stoddard

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by whswhs

You keep coming back to the assumption that "is also me" is equivalent to "is also human": That is, to treating "me" as being about what kind of entity something is, and not about what worldline the entity is on. But the only reason to have the pronouns "I" and "you" is to distinguish the source and the recipient of a signal as referred to within the content of the signal. That is what those pronouns mean. And source and recipient are distinguishable because they are in different places and times—or, in the relativistic language I have been using, they are on different worldlines. If they were not, there would be no point in having the pronoun "me" in the first place, and, indeed, no point in sending signals at all. Your stated model denies the very assumptions that are necessary to define its terms and thus is inherently logically meaningless.

Consider the phrase 'What would you do in my place?'. Switching places of two entities would cause a breaking of their worldlines, shattering the definition. However, if the word 'you' and the word 'me' are used to denote the two given personalities, the sentence makes perfect sense.

Originally Posted by whswhs

Moreover, in such expressions as "closed mindedness" and "outdated," you seem to suggest that valuing oneself as a singular entity with a singular worldline is somehow unworthy and to be transcended. But values not only are, but must be and ought to be egocentric. The only context in which it makes sense to value anything is the existence of living organisms, and living organisms act to secure both their own continued existence (which they value because it is theirs) and the propagation of their qualitative identities or, in other words, their genetic information (which they value because it is their information). They don't treat themselves and other organisms as interchangeable. What you are calling for as transhuman is not an evolution to a higher stage of life, but the denial of the very nature of life as such, and with it of any possibility of valuing anything.

What makes you think that the nature of life requires both? (Personally, I find the arguments about the definition of life fascinating, but mostly endless. Even sapience seems easier to define.)

Originally Posted by whswhs

And, ironically, in determinedly maintaining your own view in the matter against those of other people who hold different views, you are yourself being egocentric in exactly the way you decry; you are consistently refusing to enter into the viewpoint of people who think differently than you do. This is contrary to your position—but exactly what I would expect, believing as I do that egocentricity is inherent in having values at all.

Bill Stoddard

I'm not arguing with people, I'm arguing with opinions. But you are correct that I am very flawed myself, and no better than others.

[vicky_molokh]

Originally Posted by whswhs

But the point is that "V-1984 and V-2010 are the same person" follows from my premises (and Pomphis's) about worldlines being determinative of identity; we would accept radical changes in information content as being consistent with being "the same." (Comparison: If I completely erase every single file on my external hard drive, and then put entirely new files on it, it's still the same hard drive.) You do not accept worldlines being determinative of identity. Therefore your only possible criterion is similarity of information content. And the information content in V-1984 and V-2010 is substantially different. Your belief that they are "the same" is parasitic on a conceptual scheme that you disavow; it does not make any sense in your own conceptual scheme.

It's the same hard drive, but not the same files. Do you claim that scientist Alex Mercer of [Prototype] is the same person as Alex Mercer the morph? (They share the worldline, but that's about it.)

When I say 'the same person', I do not mean 'informationally identical to every bit', I mean 'similar enough in regards of our threshold of sameness'. (IMO macroscopic entities, whether material or informational, are highly unlikely to be the same to every bit or elementary particle; no, computer programs are not macroscopic as far as informational entities go.)

Originally Posted by whswhs

What we have here is two different axiom systems, like Euclidean and spherical geometry. And it's important to reach conclusions in each one from its own assumptions. If you're talking about spherical geometry, you don't get to suddenly bring up "parallel lines" as if the notion were unproblematic.

Bill Stoddard

I think the analogy is very illustrative of why we cannot agree. I also suspect it has, like all analogies, hidden flaws.

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

Consider the phrase 'What would you do in my place?'. Switching places of two entities would cause a breaking of their worldlines, shattering the definition. However, if the word 'you' and the word 'me' are used to denote the two given personalities, the sentence makes perfect sense.

That's a hypothetical false-to-fact construction, not asserted as true, but used only to shed light on the reality. The reply always contains an implicit [I am not you, but if I were in your place] at the start.

And if you do not recognize difference of worldlines, the question "what would you do in my place?" would not mean anything.

Bill Stoddard

[whswhs]

Originally Posted by vicky_molokh

It's the same hard drive, but not the same files.

I'm talking about its being the same hard drive. When we talk about physical entities, "the same" means being on the same worldline. My external hard drive now is on the same worldline as the external hard drive that was shipped from the factory several years ago, and therefore it is the same physical object.

And I am a physical organism. That's my identity.

Bill Stoddard