Some comments:
Quote:
Originally Posted by vicky_molokh
Co-ownership of a ship as an enterprise (e.g. 20%:80%), with the bank receiving a portion of the earnings pro rata, with the captain having and retaining the right to buy the shares from the bank, with some pre-agreements about what the price is and how it may or may not be adjusted. This seems to be the silent partner path, with some adjustments.
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I suppose the question becomes why banks don't purchase equity in perpetuity instead of only temporarily. They seem to be keeping all the penalties of a business partnership, except with a set return.
Quote:
Originally Posted by vicky_molokh
Both seem more suited to letting partners decide to go their separate ways (at least judging by some arguments of economists), and avoids debt, interest and the possibility of 'interest pits'. Also, in both of these cases, nothing prevents the bank from pre-agreeing that the ship's cost-to-be-sold-to-the-captain is higher than the cost-of-the-ship-as-bought-by-the-bank-from-shipyard.
What I'm interested the most are: - How each of those schemes will change the calculation of costs/payments / what the reasonable playable approximation of payment calculations should be for them.
- What changes to the legal status of ownership and insurance should I keep in mind when dealing with each of these schemes, especially during adventures.
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OK, assuming that the payments on the "loan" are fixed (i.e. no compound interest) and if the debtor doesn't pay they just lose the asset. If this is the case, calculate the value of the loan for the whole term, and divide by the number of payment periods for cost per period.
If there is no interaction between Usury-No and Usury-Yes then you might slightly increase the interest you calculate the loan with to reflect the loss to the bank if the debtor quits (the bank may only receive a few payments and a very devalued asset). If the interaction between the societies are high, the Usury-No loans are likely to have significantly higher interest because of the greater security to the investor that the Usury-Yes loans provide (assuming that the investors don't care about the lenders practices).
On the second point. Usury-No has been in its game for long enough for a the governments of its society to understand the legal fiction of the banks "investments". It's likely that the government would support this industry by creating a corporate model that doesn't rely on what amounts to a legal hack (i. e. The "borrower" assumes all responsibilities for company actions, while the "lender" is shielded). Of course, this leads to more legal hacks, for example a a corporation may provide funding for a deniable operation through the auspices of a "loan".
On the other hand, if no such structure exists, then the lender has an interest in making sure that none of the actions by the borrower endanger it, so a business agent would likely be assigned to each ship.